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Abstract
We examine the effects of antitrust policy (the prohibition of a input price discrimination)
when an emission tax is used for environmental protection. We show that antitrust policy
reduces pollution emission and improves social welfare. Therefore, antitrust policy
contributes to environmental protection.
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The welfare eﬀect of third-degree price discrimination has been intensively studied in the
last century.1 However, most studies have examined the relationship between total output
and social welfare. We employ the standard model of input price discrimination proposed
by Katz (1997) and DeGraba (1990) and examine the eﬀects of a typical antitrust pol-
icy (the Robinson-Patman Act) on environmental protection.2 The downstream market
comprises Cournot duopoly ﬁrms that produce the ﬁnal product for consumers. They
use two intermediate inputs. One is a dirty input that is supplied in a competitive mar-
ket; its use causes environmental pollution. The other is a clean input that is supplied
by the monopolist; its use does not cause any environmental pollution. The two down-
stream ﬁrms have diﬀerent production technologies and use the dirty input in diﬀerent
quantities. We refer to the ﬁrm that uses a lesser amount of the dirty input as an envi-
ronmentally friendly ﬁrm. We refer to the other ﬁrm as an environmentally unfriendly
ﬁrm. The diﬀerence in these ﬁrms’ production technologies provides the monopolist with
an incentive to price discriminate against them.
We assume that the pollution damage is serious, and the environmental protection
agency (EPA) levies an emission tax on pollution emission. We then examine the eﬀects
of a speciﬁc antitrust policy (the prohibition of an input price discrimination) in two
cases.3 In the ﬁrst case, EPA has to utilize the same tax rate regardless of the pricing
r e g i m e . I nt h es e c o n dc a s e ,E P Ad i ﬀerentiates between the tax rates of two pricing
r e g i m e ss oa st om a x i m i z es o c i a lw e l f a r e .
1See Schmalensee (1981),V a r i a n(1985), and Schwartz (1990) for the reference.
2Yoshida (2000) and Valletti (2003) generalized the analysis of input price discrimination. More
recently, Adachi (2002,2005) examines the welfare consequence of third-degree price discrimination in
t h ep r e s e n c eo fc o n s u m p t i o ne x t e r n alities. Galera and Zaratiegui (2005) generalizes the analysis to an
oligopoly framework.
3In this paper, the application of antitrust policy implies the prohibition of an input price discrimina-
tion by a monopolist. The result presented in this paper may not be valid for diﬀerent kinds of antitrust
policies.
12 The Model
Two Cournot downstream ﬁrms produce a homogeneous ﬁnal product and engage in
quantity competition. Let qi and qj denote the quantities of the ﬁnal product produced
by ﬁrm i and ﬁrm j, respectively. The aggregate supply is indicated by Q ≡
P
qi ≡ qi+qj.
The downstream ﬁrms produce their products using two types of inputs: a clean input
and a dirty input. The clean input is supplied by the upstream monopolist M, while
the dirty input is supplied in a competitive market. The monopolist produces the clean
input at a constant marginal cost cM.
The downstream ﬁr m sh a v eL e o n t i e f - t y p et e c h n o l o g i e s .T h eﬁrm i requires one unit
of the clean input and βi units of the dirty input to produce one unit of the ﬁnal product.
Let ei denote the amount of pollution emission by ﬁrm i. One unit of the dirty input
leads to one unit of pollution emission, i.e., ei = βiqi. We assume βi < βj.T h u s ,ﬁrm
i uses a smaller amount of the dirty input than ﬁrm j to produce one unit of the ﬁnal
product. We refer to ﬁrm i and ﬁrm j as environmentally friendly and environmentally
unfriendly ﬁrms, respectively. The aggregate emission is given by E ≡
P
ei.
The consumers’ utility level, U, is assumed to be additively separable from the disutil-
ity arising from the environmental damage, D(E) ≡ ϕE.T h u s ,U = u(Q)+m−D(E),
where u(Q) ≡ aQ− 1
2bQ2 and m is the numeraire consumption. Let p denote the price of
the ﬁnal product. From utility maximization by the consumers, it follows that p = u0(Q).
Thus, the downstream ﬁrms face the linear inverse demand function, p(Q) ≡ a − bQ.
EPA imposes an emission tax rate of τ.W en o r m a l i z et h ep r i c eo ft h ed i r t yi n p u tt o1.
Then, the proﬁt function of the downstream ﬁrm i is given by πi ≡ (p(Q) − ri − βi)qi −
τei,w h e r eri is the price of the intermediate input. When price discrimination is prohib-




In the subsequent analysis, we consider the two-stage game. In Stage 1, the monop-
olist sets input prices. In Stage 2, the downstream ﬁrms decide their output levels. In
2order to ﬁnd the subgame perfect equilibrium of this stage game, the usual backward
induction is employed. Thus, we begin with solving the second-stage problem.
2.1 Downstream Market
The second-stage game is characterized by Cournot duopoly with each ﬁrm incurring the
marginal cost, ci ≡ ri+βi(1+τ). We obtain the following equilibrium outputs under price
discrimination:4 qd
i = 1
3b(a−2ri+rj −(2βi−βj)(1+τ)) and Qd = 2
3b
¡
a − r + β (1 + τ)
¢
,
where r ≡ 1






pollution intensity of the two ﬁrms. If price discrimination is prohibited, i.e., ri = rj = r,
then the equilibrium outputs become qu
i = 1
3b(a − r − (2βi − βj)(1+τ)) and Qu =
2
3b(a−r+β(1+τ)). Furthermore, the second-stage Cournot-Nash equilibrium downstream
proﬁt and total emission level can be expressed as πx
i = b(qx
i )




respectively, for the pricing regime x = d, u.
2.2 Upstream Market





with respect to ri and rj. This yields the discriminatory prices given by ri = 1
2(a+cM −
βi(1 + τ)).S i n c e ri − rj = 1
2(βj − βi)(1 + τ) > 0, the environmentally friendly ﬁrm is
charged a higher input price than the environmentally unfriendly ﬁrm. Firm i’s marginal
cost becomes cd
i = 1
2(a + cM + βi(1 + τ)).





i =( r − cM)Qu. After substituting the aggregate input demand
and then maximizing πu
M through the choice of r, we obtain the optimal uniform price,
r = 1
2(a+cM −β(1+τ)), which is the average of the optimal discriminatory prices, i.e.,
r = r.F i r mj’s marginal cost becomes cu
i = 1





4The superscript d denotes the discriminatory pricing regime, while the superscript u denotes the
uniform pricing regime.
3The antitrust policy changes the pricing regime from price discrimination to uniform
pricing. It doubles the cost diﬀerence between the two downstream ﬁrms, since cu
j −cu
i =
(βj − βi)(1 + τ)=2 ( cd
j − cd
i) > 0. Therefore, the antitrust policy strengthens the
competitiveness of the environmentally friendly ﬁrm.
For an exogenously given emission tax, the equilibrium outcomes are summarized in
t h el e f tc o l u m no fT a b l e1. It follows that qd
i − qd
j = 1




> 0.T h u s ,t h e
discriminatory pricing does not reverse the marginal cost ranking.
We can show that ∂(ri − rj)/∂τ = 1
2(βj − βi) > 0. The degree of the input price
discrimination rises when the emission tax is increased. We also know that the tax











> 0. The tax increase widens the output
diﬀerence between the two downstream ﬁrms.
The output diﬀerence under uniform pricing is qu
i − qu
j = 1









j)/∂τ > 0. T h i si m p l i e st h a tt h ee ﬀect of the tax
increase on the output diﬀerence is stronger under price discrimination.
Finally, we examine the eﬀectiveness of the emission tax under both pricing regimes.
By diﬀerentiating the total emission with respect to τ, we can compare the eﬀectiveness
















where we deﬁne K ≡ β
2
i − βiβj + β
2
j > 0 and employ 2K − β
2






¢2 /4 > 0.
Lemma 1 Antitrust policy increases the eﬀectiveness of the emission taxation.
2.3 Optimal Emission Tax Rates
We now derive the optimal tax rates under both pricing regimes. The social welfare is
W ≡ u(Q) − pQ − D(E)+πM +
P
πi + τE,w h e r et h eﬁrst three terms constitute
4the consumer’s surplus net of the environmental damage, the next two terms are the
upstream and downstream proﬁts, and the last term is the tax revenue. Substituting the
above expressions into u(Q), πM, πi and D(E), we write the social welfare under the














where A ≡ a − cM > 0.D i ﬀerentiating W with respect to τ, we obtain the ﬁrst-order
condition for the optimal emission tax rate:
dWx
dτ








Substituting the comparative statics results under each regime, we obtain the optimal
total outputs for the pricing regime x = d, u.W ed e n o t et h e ma sQx∗ in the right column
of Table 1, together with the other optimal outcomes. Solving Qx∗ = Qx for τ yields the
optimal rate of emission tax for both regimes:
τ
d =
3K (1 + ϕ) − 2Aβ
β







When these optimal tax rates are utilized, both downstream ﬁrms produce positive out-





0,s i n c eK − β
2
> 0.
Lemma 2 The optimal emission tax rate under price discrimination is lower than that
under uniform pricing.
We assume that the pollution damage is serious. Therefore, the parameters are re-
stricted as follows:
Assumption 1: 3K (1 + ϕ) > 2Aβ
5This assumption implies that 1+τu and 1+τd are both positive. Since τu > τd,
1+τd > 0 is suﬃcient. However, we require the condition for 1+τu > 0 to prove that
∆E∗ is negative.
3W e l f a r e E ﬀect of the Antitrust Policy
3.1 First Case: EPA cannot set the tax rate.
EPA has to utilize the same tax rate regardless of the pricing regime. Using the equilib-
rium outcomes presented in the left column of Table 1, we can examine the welfare eﬀect
of the antitrust policy.
First, we ﬁnd ∆Q ≡ Qu − Qd =0and ∆E ≡ Eu − Ed = − 1
3b (1 + τ)(K − β
2
) < 0.
The total output is unaﬀected by the regime change while total emission is reduced.
However, the environmental condition is improved by the antitrust policy. If consumer
welfare is given by the diﬀerence between consumer surplus and pollution damage, then
antitrust policy improves it.
We now evaluate the welfare eﬀect of the antitrust policy as follows: ∆W = −
P
βi∆qi
−ϕ∆E. When price discrimination is permitted, the monopolist charges the environmen-
tally friendly ﬁrm a higher input price than it does the environmentally unfriendly ﬁrm.
Antitrust policy shifts the production from the environmentally unfriendly ﬁrm to the
environmentally friendly ﬁrm, while maintaining the aggregate output at the same level.
This resolves the production ineﬃciency, which is captured by the term,
P
βi∆qi < 0.
Furthermore, the antitrust policy reduces the total pollution emission and mitigates
the pollution problem. Therefore, it also resolves the environmental ineﬃciency. From
E =
P
βiqi, two welfare gains (production and environmental eﬃciencies) obtained by
the antitrust policy amount to ∆W = 1




Proposition 1 When an emission tax rate is exogenously determined, social welfare is
improved by antitrust policy.
63.2 Second Case: EPA optimizes the tax rate.
EPA now sets the emission tax rate. By substituting the optimal emission tax rates into
the corresponding conditions, we obtain equilibrium outcomes as given in Table 1.
The change in total output is ∆Q∗ = −(1 + ϕ)(K − β
2
)/(bβ) < 0. Therefore, the
total output is reduced by the antitrust policy.













Assumption 1 requires 2Aβ < 3K (1 + ϕ).F r o m3K −β
2
>K , it follows that ∆E∗ < 0.













Assumption 1 requires 4Aβ to be under 6K (1 + ϕ).F r o m3K−β
2
> 2K, it follows that
∆W∗ > 0. This implies that antitrust policy improves social welfare.
Proposition 2 When an emission tax rate is optimally chosen, social welfare is in-
creased by antitrust policy.
4C o n c l u s i o n
This note has examined the eﬀect of antitrust policy when an emission tax is used for
environmental protection. We consider two cases. In the ﬁrst case, it is assumed that
the same emission tax rate is applied regardless of the pricing regime. In the second
case, it is assumed that the emission tax rate is optimized depending on the pricing
regime. In both cases, we show that antitrust policy (the prohibition of an input price
discrimination) reduces the total emission and improves social welfare. Furthermore, it
7enhances the eﬀectiveness of the pollution taxation. The joint use of pollution taxation
and antitrust policy is favorable for environmental protection.
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8Table 1. Equilibrium Outcomes
Case 1 Case 2
EPA cannot set the tax rate. EPA optimizes the tax rate.
Input Prices
ri − cM =
A−(1+τ)βi
2 ; r∗




r − cM =
A−(1+τ)β



































































Note. A ≡ a − cM > 0,K≡ β − βiβj + β
2





¢2 /4 > 0.
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